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ABSTRACT
A new economic model for the analysis of scholarly publishing – journal 
publishing in particular – is proposed that draws on club theory. The 
standard approach builds on market failure in the private production 
(by research scholars) of a public good (new scholarly knowledge). 
In this model, publishing is communication, as the dissemination of 
information. But a club model views publishing differently: namely 
as group formation, where members form groups in order to confer 
externalities on each other, subject to congestion. A journal is a self-
constituted group, endeavouring to create new knowledge. In this 
sense, a journal is a club. The knowledge club model of a journal seeks 
to balance the positive externalities of a shared resource (readers, 
citations, referees) against the negative externalities of crowding 
(decreased prospect of publishing in that journal). A new economic 
model of a journal as a knowledge club is elaborated. We suggest 
some consequences for the management of journals and financial 
models that might be developed to support them.
Economists against journals
The existence of commercial scholarly journal publishers follows from the economics of 
specialisation and the division of labour. Lacy (1963) (prior to gender-neutral scholarly 
language) puts it like this:
Between the artist and his audience stands the medium of communication through which he 
must reach them: … the broadcast networks, the publishing houses. … Throughout history 
an entrepreneur of some kind has assembled the artist’s audience and given him the chance 
to be heard (p.42).
Substitute scholar for ‘artist’ and other scholars for ‘audience’, and we have the standard 
modern commercial model of journal publishing. From the perspective of economic analy-
sis, this model is predicated on the efficient organisation of the specialised capital and skills 
required to produce and distribute scholarly journals, and recognition that these capabilities 
were not efficiently possessed by scholars (or artists) as the producers and consumers of 
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scholarly output. The economic logic of this situation resulted in the papyrocentric business 
model (Harnad, 1995; where ‘papyrocentric’ invokes images of paper distribution, but also 
embraces the most developed organisational form – publishers) of a closed-access journal 
in which a private publishing company holds the intellectual property rights and is supplied 
with free content and free labour (Bergstrom, 2001; Houghton and Oppenheim, 2010).
This modern economic model, with its attendant commercial players and profits, is a 
departure from the original model of journals. While part of the original motivation of the 
first research publication in serial form – the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 
in 1665 – was to make money (Hall, 1954), the early history of scholarly publishing is largely 
one of community subsidy to cover losses or breaking even. The first serials to which the 
name ‘journal’ was applied in the nineteenth century often struggled to find audiences 
sufficiently large to justify the printing of content of interest to professional researchers. 
The modern system developed only in the mid-twentieth century. The wartime and post-
war expansion of public research funding and consequent expansion and globalisation of 
research communities were soon exploited by an entrepreneur-led proliferation of increas-
ingly specialised journals, following the lead of Robert Maxwell’s Pergamon Press (Buranyi, 
2017). The small society presses, struggling to cope with growing scale, were supported 
and then largely supplanted by the ‘Big 5’ commercial presses: Elsevier (which acquired 
Pergamon in 1991), Wiley, Springer, Taylor & Francis and Sage. These newly-empowered 
players brought an industrial approach to the publication and dissemination process, for 
the first time realising the benefits that these specialised capital and skills could provide 
by operating at a scale that was unprecedented to that date. The successful publishers grew 
(and consolidated to grow further) alongside a pre-Cambrian explosion and specialisation 
of journals to create the modern landscape in which the majority of journals is owned, 
controlled or at least produced by a handful of globalised companies.
But with the arrival of the computer, the internet and soon the blockchain, the economics 
of this model shifted (Kahin and Varian, 2000; Gans, 2000; Bergstrom and Bergstrom, 2001; 
Fyffe and Shulenburger, 2002; Willinsky, 2005; Houghton and Sheehan, 2009; Houghton and 
Oppenheim, 2010). The wide availability of desktop hardware and software enabled new capa-
bilities among authors, and an expectation from publishers that authors would self-manage 
much of the layout and editing of articles. Meanwhile, technologies for storing articles (data-
bases), discovering articles (digital object identifiers and advanced search technologies), citing 
and reviewing, made it easier for academics to engage with each other’s work. This has forced 
two interrelated pressures on the extant scholarly publishing model that, taken together, sug-
gest: (1) that it is profoundly broken (Bergstrom and Bergstrom, 2006); and (2) that a general 
move to an open access regime is either under way or imminent (Bergstrom and Bergstrom, 
2004; Willinsky, 2006, 2009; Houghton, 2011, Armstrong, 2014; McCabe and Snyder, 2014).
First, it is no longer clear that the closed access proprietary model is at all necessary 
(Houghton, 2001). As the economists Conley and Wooders (2009, p.71) explain:
Open access journals have overwhelming cost advantage over commercial publishers. In addi-
tion, open access is consistent with our mission as scholars to increase and spread knowledge 
and also feeds our personal and professional interests much more directly. But we are still 
living with the system of scholarly communication we inherited from the papyrocentric era.
Second, the modern digital open access model still preserves many dysfunctional aspects of 
the older model of scholarly journal, including, as Bruno Frey (2003) points out, the tendency 
for scholars to have to prostitute themselves before editors and referees, owing to the veto 
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power that referees wield and the perceived necessity of journal publication to climb career 
ladders. Frey proposes a series of institutional reforms in the way property rights work in 
scholarly publishing to mitigate this. Furthermore, as Conley (2012) editorialises, the result 
is bad for the scholarly community because it entrenches a model with very high rejection 
rates that is inordinately wasteful of ‘free’ scholarly resources. Conley finds this to be:
a new, and I think compelling, reason to try to reclaim scholarly communication back from 
commercial publishers and into the community of scholars … (p. 7)
The twentieth-century publishing model made economic sense as outsourced specialisa-
tion, but technological change has upended that logic by dramatically lowering the cost of 
in-house production. The old model holds on through legacy effects and competitive ‘costly 
signalling’ of perceived prestige through selected mastheads, and has transformed into a 
model of monopoly exploitation. This is costly in pecuniary terms, but also in the ability 
of scholarly communities to develop and change publishing institutions to suit their own 
needs. There is now a broad consensus that the economics of scholarly publishing is broken 
and that a new way forward turns on exploitation of new, open access, business models 
(Binfield, 2013). But open access models, including hybrid models (Björk, 2012), are also 
proving difficult to implement, running into problems of cost, free-riding and incompati-
bility with extant scholarly research institutions (Neylon, 2015a).
This paper proposes a new approach to the economics of scholarly publishing that is 
based around the joint production and consumption of scholarly output by the scholarly 
community. We argue that this can be represented not as an economics of firms, markets 
and specialisation, but as an economics of team production and consumption in what we 
style ‘knowledge clubs’ (Hartley, 2015).
The organisation of scholarly publishing
The organisation of scholarly publishing, and indeed its broader political economy context, 
can usefully be understood through the narrower lens of economic analysis. The economics 
of publishing – not only scholarly publishing, but also quality news journalism – is usually 
formulated as an intermediating service in the production and consumption of a private 
good (information) with public good-like properties (owing to appropriability and positive 
externalities). Significant fixed costs in publishing, mostly attributable to capital require-
ments (e.g. printing presses and distribution networks) and specialist skills (e.g. typesetting, 
editing) pushed this model towards imperfect competition. The information economics of 
branded quality signalling – in authors, mastheads and presses – also tended to reinforce a 
winner-take-all oligopolistic market structure. Alternative institutional arrangements and 
experiments were created for communities and subcultures (for instance, zines) in reaction 
to these outcomes. For the most part, within the news media and publishing domains, these 
group-based efforts remained marginal players (Rennie, 2006). But when the technology of 
publishing changes, so does everything else (Eisenstein, 1982; Ong, 2012).
Through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, entrepreneurial solutions were insti-
tutionally embedded within business models that furnished workable solutions to this 
problem. For instance, publicly-funded university libraries maintained print subscriptions 
to large suites of scholarly journals; or newspapers, which often held monopoly posi-
tions, cross-subsidised news journalism with classified advertising. The crisis in scholarly 
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publishing in which new digital technologies run headlong into old business models, has 
been diagnosed as a form of disruption awaiting transformation, possibly through new 
models of public subsidy, or new business models, or both.
One common way to look at this is through the lens of an evolutionary industrial 
transformation (what Joseph Schumpeter called ‘creative destruction’) involving deep 
endogenous change in the organisational and market order. Individual academics who 
both produce and consume journals may worry about whether the unfolding sequence of 
development will eventually be characterised by a cataclysmic shakeout or by a smoother 
sequence of adjustments in what broadly appears to be the standard view (through the lens 
of the Schumpeterian industrial transformation model) of the current crisis in scholarly 
publishing and quality journalism.
The consequence of this narrative of disruption, whether promoted by advocates or 
feared (or disdained) by commercial incumbents, is that it depends on new entrepreneurs 
to create new markets. The narrative predicts that the Schumpeterian arrival of these new 
players will defeat the once-lean competitors of the mid-to-late twentieth century that have 
become bloated monopolists through consolidation. The new technology opportunity and 
entrepreneurial competition will sort this out through an industrial transformation from 
one technological model (the printing press and physical distribution) and one financial 
model (university subscriptions) to a new technological model (free online distribution of 
web ‘native’ content) and consequently new financial models (currently controversial but, 
according to the Schumpeterian model, surely to be determined by the market). This nar-
rative has no place for the actual generators and consumers of value, the research author, 
referee, editor, and reader.
The disruption narrative sits atop a broader one of the transformation from closed private 
goods (the profits of publishers) into public (and therefore open) goods. The dichotomy 
between private and public goods is central to the rhetoric of open access advocates, whose 
arguments seem rooted largely in economics and the politics of public good provision-
ing. By the same token, it is also central to the rhetoric of traditional publisher lobbyists 
and traditionalists within the research community, who argue that the twentieth-century 
industrial model is a successful public-private partnership in which commercial entities 
obtain a reasonable return on private investment, and the research community receives a 
useable public-like good in return for its contributions. But once again, these arguments, 
while often referencing the ‘community’, usually without defining it, rarely engage with 
how the community is constituted, what it is contributing and what it receives in return 
for any specific journal.
An alternative view would be to place the community at the centre of an economic 
model. This would provide an alternative to both the twentieth-century broadcast/indus-
trial model built on rational specialisation and the political argumentation based on the 
public-private dichotomy. Such a model would focus on the (self)-identity, contribution 
and benefits to a community. We believe that this form of model could provide new insight 
into methods by which a given community can sustain itself, supporting the re-emergence 
of local commons, or clubs (Harvie, 2004). Such a model may also help to refine arguments 
that placing the community at the centre of scholarly publishing would be a return to the 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century roots of our publishing system (Fyfe et al., 2017). Our 
argument, therefore, is that we need to consider what it means to view scholarly publishing 
through the lens of club theory and the concept of a club good.
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Knowledge clubs
Club theory introduces an intermediate option between the economics of a world made 
entirely of individuals coordinated by markets (private goods), and a world of a collective 
coordinated by the state (public goods), with a third class that is based around the formation 
of self-interested and coordinated groups (or clubs). A club can be simply a firm that both 
produces and consumes. A moment’s reflection on the fact that scholars both produce and 
consume their own product does suggest that club theory is prima facie a good approxima-
tion of scholarly publishing (Neylon, 2015, 2016). To expand this, we will need to consider 
who may be identified as members of this club and what the various contributions and 
benefits for members might be.
Traditionally, we would consider a journal to be a node that organises market relations 
among authors, readers and specialist publishing capabilities. This naturally leads to the 
presumption of outsourcing of various of these roles in a competitive market. In our new 
model, we see a journal as a club in which access to these services is internalised as a mem-
bership benefit. While the services might still be outsourced, in practice it can be seen that 
such a shift potentially has substantial political and economic consequences as to how we 
see the relations among players. Owners of capital and their customers are seen as service 
providers to communities. We have a good economic understanding of the former, but not 
of the latter.
Our argument here, then, elucidates a club-theoretic understanding of scholarly publish-
ing and uses this to probe the economic and political crises challenging the current systems. 
We focus entirely on scholarly publishing in journals, but the general points we advance, 
mutatis mutandis, extend to scholarly publishing in books (Montgomery, 2015), and to 
quality journalism, to which we return in our Conclusion. The reason for this tight focus 
is that scholarly journals, particularly small society journals, present the clearest example 
of the knowledge club model.
The concept of a ‘knowledge club’ is based on the demic-diffusion model of cultural 
science developed by Hartley and Potts (2014). This is a coherent analytical framework built 
out of a synthesis of cultural studies, evolutionary economics and evolutionary biology. Its 
core hypothesis is that the evolutionary function of culture is to form groups, that the evo-
lutionary function of culture-formed groups is to produce knowledge, and that the selection 
mechanism over those groups operates at the margin of other groups (knowledge is most 
intensively produced at group-boundaries, in interaction with other, competing groups). The 
purpose of cultural science is to naturalise the study of culture, based around the growth of 
knowledge, and therein to endogenise human group formation about knowledge production 
and consumption. This paper will not advance that model directly, but it is an application 
of cultural science in that it directs the analysis of the ‘publishing problem’ to consider 
group-formation dynamics. A purpose of this paper, then, is to explore this cultural science 
hypothesis using the (well-known and established) tools of the economics of club theory.
To reform scholarly publishing, we need to recognise that a journal is a club. A scholarly 
journal is neither a private good nor a public good; it is a club good (Neylon, 2015a). A 
journal is a publishing operation, both in production and in consumption, which is best 
understood – dynamically as well as statically – as a club good, meaning that the basic 
economics of club goods should help in making sense of the turmoil that the scholarly 
publishing industry is currently experiencing.
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What is a club good?
If a journal is ideally a club, what then is a club? Economic theory has a very specific answer 
to this question. Club goods are distinguished from private goods (where consumption is 
both rivalrous and excludable) and public goods (where consumption is non-rivalrous and 
exclusion is not possible) by being non-rivalrous (up to a congestion point) but excludable. 
Completing the standard four-term matrix are common pool resources, which are rivalrous 
but non-excludable (Ostrom, 1990). Club goods are also known as ‘toll goods’ (Ostrom and 
Ostrom, 1999) because the congestion point requires a toll for efficiency; and also as ‘local 
public goods’ (Scotchmer, 2002) because groups are often spatially organised.
The concept of a club good was introduced into economic theory by James Buchanan 
(1965) to recognise that the Samuelsonian division between private goods provided by mar-
kets and public goods provided by the state (Samuelson, 1954) was missing an important 
institutional construction in the ability of small organised groups (Olson, 1965) to come 
together privately to produce and consume local public goods (Sandler, 2013). Club theory 
is now a standard foundation of modern general equilibrium microeconomics (Berglas, 
1976; Sandler and Tschirhart, 1980, 1997). Buchanan’s point is that many things that were 
commonly portrayed as public goods (hospitals, schools, roads, swimming pools, etc.) are 
actually better understood as club goods.
The political economy imperative behind the club goods concept was not on the side of 
markets versus the state, but rather a more oblique point on the private-public continuum 
in that it argued for the economic efficiency of organised free individuals (groups, associa-
tions) to form groups that could self-govern to produce public goods, and that this outcome 
is economically superior to both market solutions and government solutions. Clubs are 
non-market solutions to public-good problems that rely on the ability of self-constituted 
groups both to self-organise and successfully to self-govern. They are non-market solutions 
in the technical sense that they do not rely on private property rights and price mechanisms 
for coordination of the club good, but rather on culture (shared understandings and norms, 
etc.) and governance institutions. This usually happens locally for what is increasingly 
recognised as evolutionary-theoretic reasons (Bowles and Gintis, 2009); hence the local 
public good focus on such things as health clubs, sports clubs, learning clubs (libraries), 
transport clubs (toll roads), and so on. But note that the internet and its digital affordances 
make this group formation less a spatial phenomenon and more a cultural phenomenon. 
This is the true implication of Anderson’s ‘long tail’ thesis (2006): that the internet allows 
connection into clubs to occur without reference to ethno-territorial boundaries such that 
locally unviable nodes of common interest can ‘club together’ across cyberspace to create 
a community of affinity and thence a market. Locality is no longer necessarily geographic, 
but may be demic. Clubs, then, refer to the formation of groups of people who share a 
common concern, who are willing to pool their common resources and specialisation skills, 
and to act in concert in pursuit of shared externalities.1 This is why the economics of clubs 
overlaps substantially with the economics of knowledge commons (Ostrom and Hess, 2007; 
Frischmann et al., 2014).
In a market of individual actors, the key institutional mechanism of coordination is 
bilateral exchange. If both parties expect to gain such that marginal private benefit is greater 
than marginal private cost, then the transaction will occur and not otherwise. This prin-
ciple underpins both general equilibrium theory and welfare economics. In the state or 
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government, the key institutional mechanism is coercion to overcome free-riding in provid-
ing a public good such that the sum of marginal benefits for each agent is greater than the 
total marginal cost of public provision. This principle underpins the logic of the state and its 
powers. In a club, the key institutional mechanism is voluntary, culture-made, group forma-
tion such that the private benefit condition holds for a shared good. Clubs are voluntary in 
the language of microeconomics, but in cultural science ‘voluntary’ should be understood 
as a secondary feature of culture-made groups. Culture makes groups that are unified and 
bounded by shared codes, relationships, identity and meaning. The production of free indi-
viduals who are in possession of the economic rationality needed voluntarily to choose to 
join or form a club is a function of culture-made ‘we’ groups or demes. It follows that not 
everyone can join a club (demic outsiders); and that free individual choice is itself a product 
or outcome of demes, not a causal mechanism. This, first and foremost, is a socio-cultural 
principle, not an economic or political one. Scotchmer (2002, p.1999) explains:
Club models are models of group formation. … The basic notion of club economies is that 
agents form groups to confer externalities on each other. The main source of these externalities 
in the original Buchanan (1965) paper are public services. Buchanan assumes that agents band 
together to share the cost of (excludable) public goods. Optimal sharing groups are bounded 
in size because of a second externality, crowding.
It is intuitive to think of a club as relating to a shared resource, such as a local swimming 
pool, but Scotchmer’s language is precise: ‘agents form groups to confer externalities on 
each other’. Clubs are in this sense necessarily economically rational (and politically via-
ble) about the costs and benefits of group formation. Individuals join clubs because they 
expect to benefit. In the case of scholarly journals, the benefits consist of identity, where 
participation in the making of journal goods legitimises and validates status (cf. Lave and 
Wenger, 1991), prestige, where citations accrue from participation as either contributor 
or editor (and, less successfully, as referee) via a group of readers either within the club or 
aspiring to join it. The ‘club’ is therefore not the reading public as traditionally understood 
(Watt, 1957/2001), but a membership that is group-recognised through shared codes and 
peer-based, knowledge-sharing activities.
Sandler and Tschirhart (1997) explain five key differences in the economic properties of 
clubs and club goods with respect to public goods:
(1)  Clubs are voluntary, which means that members join clubs only where they expect 
a net benefit (hence for a club good, unlike a public good, the marginal rate of 
substitution is always positive).
(2)  Clubs involve sharing, which results in crowding (or congestion). Crowding implies 
an upper limit of the optimal size of the club, and tolls to control crowding. There 
are two types of crowding – anonymous, and non-anonymous, where attributes 
of other members are important determinants of crowding.
(3)  Clubs imply finite groups that balance at the margin externality benefits with costs 
associated with crowding, such that there are non-members who are excluded. This 
also implies an exclusion mechanism that operates at less cost than the benefits 
from the club.
(4)  Clubs can partition over a population, enabling competition among clubs. For any 
population, and for a given externality and congestion function, there will exist an 
optimal number of clubs.
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(5)  A club involves two simultaneous choices: membership size and provision level 
of the shared good.
A club, therefore, is a self-organising group that, in the language of microeconomics, expects 
to benefit from the net externalities members impose on each other, minus the costs of 
doing so, and organised such that an optimal club size exists (because of crowding). Clubs 
are voluntary (in the microeconomic rather than cultural sense); clubs involve pooling 
resources; and clubs involve exclusion mechanisms which are endogenous aspects of the 
voluntary pooling mechanisms that define the economics of a club. The implication, as 
Buchanan (1965) first pointed out, is that clubs have optimal sizes that are determined by 
technological and institutional factors. Many forms of economic organisation are clubs and, 
in the past 40 years, economists have explored some of their most obvious instances, as 
well as many less obvious forms (Scotchmer, 2002). The central implication is that scholarly 
journals originate within clubs. We argue that they work best when they are organised as 
clubs in the sense of knowledge clubs, but that there has been an unfortunate but pervasive 
tendency to try and push them towards operating as market goods (privately supplied by 
publishing firms) or as public goods (open access). But a journal is in essence a club good.
The economics of knowledge production and consumption
To identify a scholarly journal as a club, we need to connect the basic elements of club 
theory, which is about a group and the public good it seeks to produce and consume, to the 
externalities it seeks to impose and the congestion effects it will experience. The first part 
is simple. The group is scholars interested in a particular question or intellectual domain. 
This is the extension of the fabled ‘invisible college’ (de Solla Price, 1963) or ‘imagined 
community’ (Anderson, 1991) of scholars who pursue ideas, seeking each other out to 
advance a domain of knowledge in which they all have a stake. Publishing is also a crucial 
part of creating a scholarly identity and central to the community of a discipline (Lave and 
Wenger, 1991). Scholars are perhaps the most club-like of all animals, outside the military.
Less obvious are the costs and benefits of a scholarly publishing club, or knowledge club. 
First, a journal is a club where members confer externalities on each other. They do so in 
both production and consumption. The externalities here are those of reading, understand-
ing, citing and refereeing the papers that each scholar writes. Scholarly papers are written 
to be read and then to be acted upon by other scholars: they are not simply consumption 
goods, but inputs into further scholarly production. They are both outputs and inputs. In 
fact, membership, communication and action in this context are all better explained as 
functions of culture and language than of economic exchange, which is but a means to 
an end, although the economic-cultural combination results in the growth of knowledge. 
Scholarly production and publishing differs from the publishing of novels or journalism, for 
example, in that the producers and the consumers are not distinct sets; rather they are an 
overlapping set, a club. (This raises the interesting question of whether large-scale scholar-
ly-commercial journals, such as Nature and Science, are journals (club goods) or journalism 
(market-goods).) The producers of scholarly knowledge seek to impose externalities on 
each other. They want not just to produce papers, but to produce papers that will be read 
by a particular other group, possibly anonymous and unmet (as in the invisible college), 
but quite precisely imagined. They are producing a scholarly field, a culture-made group.
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The shared good in production is mutual attention to an idea, which is the good alleg-
edly supplied by the publishing intermediary in the idealised form of generalised attention 
(Lanham, 2006). Compared with a private good, where such attention must be purchased, 
scholarly publishing provides attention for free (in effect, the toll). But what scholars are 
purchasing in their supply of content is clearly a club good: it is shared access to the benefits 
of other smart, like-minded scholars who are implicitly part of an open team-production 
exercise, itself imagined as part of a larger knowledge commons.2
From the communication perspective, congestion or crowding is a more difficult concept 
to grasp. Knowledge producers could reasonably be expected to prefer more readers to 
fewer, and higher quality readers (better informed or placed) to lower quality. The positive 
externality they wish to impose is knowledge, such that the fullest extent of the imagined 
community is not confined to disciplinary specialists, but may extend to all within a particu-
lar deme; for example, ‘our’ industry, city, nation, or even species. But, in practice, scholarly 
production does not take humanity or any other general population as its interlocutor. Most 
scholars actually have in mind a finite and possibly small (long tail) set of readers, even 
when these are people they may not know, or who may exist only in the future. Scholarly 
production is for a community of peers. The production and consumption realities of schol-
arship and science mean that there is only a finite set of people who are potential readers of 
the product. This is a minimum value subset of the ideal club, meaning that the publishing 
club experiences heterogeneous crowding (Scotchmer, 2002). The key point is that the set of 
potential producers and the set of incumbent consumers are the same set, although actual 
producers may harbour ambitions to enlarge the club by attracting previously unengaged 
readers. That same set of individual producers seeking knowledge dispersion is also com-
peting to publish in the same attention space, as defined by the finite qualities of a journal, 
which is therefore a club.
A journal is a club because there is both shared positive externalities as the prime 
resource, which is new knowledge by self and others3; and there is also congestion, caused 
by finite attention in the readers, and in one’s own time, to read, understand, comment, 
critique and (ultimately most important) to adopt. A scholarly journal is therefore a club 
in the specific senses of being: (1) voluntary; (2) non-anonymously crowded; (3) exclusive; 
(4) globally partitioned; and (5) rationally constructed:
(1)  Voluntary means that agents within a given demic group join clubs based on a 
rational calculus. If the benefits are greater than the costs, then they join a club. The 
benefits are basically those of being read by others; the costs are those of reading 
and citing others, and aligning their productive purposes with the ideas of the 
club. Voluntary means that they make this choice based on their best assessment 
of career payoff and field (or deme) prosperity.
(2)  Non-anonymously crowded means that agents care who else is in the club. This 
is not just a matter of cost sharing, as with contributing to the cost of a swim-
ming pool, but also cost signalling, because the more prestigious or authoritative 
the other members, the more exclusive and therefore valuable is their member-
ship (Potts et al., 2008). The implication from club theory economics is that we 
can expect differential tolls as access prices, which may sometimes be negative.4 
Crowding means that each additional club member imposes a cost, and the most 
obvious cost in a scholarly club is access to the journal, not simply to read, but 
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to access the means of production and dissemination. In a knowledge club with 
30 members, each may be published, on average, once a year. In a knowledge club 
with 300 or 3000 members, the frequency is lower. But, of course, there is more 
knowledge (and prestige – up to a congestion point) in the larger club. So, on 
balance, there will be a trade-off on both margins.
(3)  Exclusion means that a club is a mechanism for limiting the benefits of non-mem-
bers, which happens quite naturally (i.e. culturally) in scholarly knowledge clubs 
by simple cost of access in time and language. Scholarly communities use specific 
language, partly for precision and partly for exclusion (Pagel, 2012). But knowledge 
clubs in general arrive at exclusion technologies, not all of which are technologi-
cal. Indeed, many of them are social and cultural, creating boundaries in the way 
that languages do. It is usually easy to distinguish insiders (specialists or scientists 
in general) from outsiders (in expert disciplines or general populations). Hostile 
pranks, such as the Sokal hoax/fraud (Sturrock, 1998), demonstrate that clubs may 
be hoodwinked by outsiders who apparently ‘speak their language’ but are in fact 
using it to challenge their knowledge. In short, patterns of inclusion/exclusion are 
demic, not economic.
(4)  Global partition recognises that clubs will be finite and that there will be other clubs 
emerging at the margin, and possibly closely related (or identical, as in public good 
clubs over spatial domains). But in scholarly publishing, club theory predicts that 
there will be many entrepreneurial opportunities at the margin of each club. In 
essence, club theory implies that there will also be ongoing competition, and there-
fore that the rent each club creates is ultimately contestable (Baumol et al., 1982). 
One reason for this is the accelerating number of overlapping clubs, commons and 
demes to which any one individual may belong (Hartley and Potts, 2014). More 
clubs per person leads to higher level congestion of clubs with the result that choices 
to participate exceed attention capacity. In scholarly publishing, this manifests itself 
in a proliferation of journals about a given topic (at least one from each of the Big 5 
publishers). Even the most motivated and active of scholars cannot follow them all. 
Cultural distinctions based on territory, affinity or ideology begin to play a greater 
role than long tail theory would require; simultaneously, the toll exacted for entry 
to any one knowledge club may increasingly be resented and avoided.
(5)  Rational construction means that club choice is a dual choice of membership (to 
join or not) and also of quantity (what level the club will supply). The level of inter-
dependent externality (the local public good) a club chooses to offer also affects 
the demand for that club, which in turn affects the toll the club can charge at the 
margin. The point is that in general equilibrium this choice is determined simul-
taneously. In scholarly publishing, at least one of these variables is expectational. 
In consequence, knowledge clubs are speculative assets.
Clubs in practice: from an idealised case towards reality
The simplest application of the model is to the case of an idealised small scholarly society. 
While this is highly simplified, it is still close to the reality of some small scholarly societies 
in the humanities. As a starting point, we consider a society focused on a specific area of 
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research publishing one journal that is made available to members. In this idealised case, 
the overall community of interest is clear, it is the set of members of the society. This – 
again in our simplified case – is the same as the set of readers of the journal. Authors and 
reviewers are assumed to come from the membership. Members support the society through 
membership fees that sustain access to the means of producing the journal (this might be 
managed in-house or more likely contracted out). Membership is voluntary, at least in the 
sociological sense referred to above.
Congestion occurs in two places: in access to publication space within the journal itself 
(a restriction that applies mores strongly to print, but remains, albeit at a reduced level, for 
online journals); and in access to the attention and readership of subscribing members. 
Crowding is non-anonymous. Authors, and other members, care a great deal about who 
else is a member, who else is an author and exactly how the attention of specific readers is 
apportioned (Potts et al., 2008). Invitations to provide reviews and commentary, effectively 
offering space in the journal and a line on the curriculum vitae with lower than usual bar-
riers to entry (i.e. less heavily refereed) show the differential tolls in play. Having the ‘right’ 
people publish in the journal adds prestige benefits for all members.
Exclusion occurs trivially through a lack of access to non-members. Less trivially, library 
subscriptions are almost always substantially more expensive than individual memberships. 
Language and shared narratives will also contribute to exclusion, but the primary mode is 
through exclusion from the status of member of the society, conferred only on those who, 
tautologically, are paid-up members. The path to membership may be more or less clear, but 
can be understood through the lens of legitimate peripheral participation as described by 
Lave and Wenger (1991), who place the issue of community at the centre of their analysis 
of situated learning. This reinforces the role of learning the language and identity making 
(and hence prestige of the community as a motivation towards identity making) as core 
elements of community definition and therefore exclusion.
The club is finite, both in terms of authors and society members (at least at any given 
point in time) and will frequently be in competition with other similar clubs at the mar-
gins. This competition has increased with the gradual disappearance (once distribution 
was industrialised and then digitised) of many national and local societies that flourished 
in a world of physical distribution and face-to-face meetings. Finally, the choice to join is 
clearly dependent on an expectation of what benefits will arise, both in terms of content of 
the journal and opportunities to publish. In principle, a member’s choice to join and the 
club’s decision to publish are both rational and dependent on each other.
Adding complexity to the model
The simple model of a society journal described above is an idealised case in which the 
club-like nature of all the relevant activities is clear. However, while it captures the historical 
roots of many of today’s journals and publishers, it misses many important complexities of 
real cases. Perhaps the most obvious is that the financial cost of supporting most journals 
is today borne largely by academic libraries.
Membership of an academic institution with the relevant benefits, including access to 
subscription content, is another parallel club. This complicates the situation, but also in 
part clarifies it by separating financial contributions from others, including the effort of 
reviewing, authorship and editorial work, as well as the less tangible labour of constructing 
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and reinforcing the club identity. Further work will be needed to define those situations 
which are better analysed as complex clubs, with differential membership contributions, 
and those situations where multiple clubs are interacting.
The second complexity is the way in which the communities of authors, readers and 
editorial contributors have drifted apart over the course of the twentieth century. In its 
extreme, we can compare cases such as Nature, where the authorship community is a minis-
cule part of the readership community, but also cases like PLOS ONE where a very large set 
of authors cannot be said to be members of an identifiably functioning community. There 
are clubs within the set of PLOS ONE authors and editors, and it could be argued that the 
authors in Nature (but not the readers) make up a (highly exclusive) club. However, the clubs 
of readers, authors, editors and (as illustrated by the role of academic libraries) financial 
supporters have drifted apart.
The first point to make is that we diagnose this as a problem, potentially a serious one. 
If our argument is that clubs and communities are capable of acting together to solve col-
lective action provisioning problems in ways that are more efficient than either markets 
or the state, then the dissolution of clubs, or their inability to coordinate, will lead to inef-
ficient or non-existent provisioning. Our model predicts that such journals as Nature and 
PLOS ONE will be found to be economically inefficient when properly analysed. Others 
have noted that the loss of community control over journal production appears to lead to 
higher costs, and therefore implicitly economic inefficiencies (Fyfe et al., 2017). We would 
not, however, argue that a return to economic and governance models of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries is the solution. Rather, we need to understand how today’s clubs 
and communities interact with each other.
Nonetheless, for all that the clear alignment of author and reader clubs has degraded, 
the identity of scholars remains tightly bound to choices of where (and how) to publish. 
Membership of an academic community may be tied to publication in specific venues and 
vice versa (e.g. one may not publish in Cinema Journal unless one is a member of the Society 
for Cinema and Media Studies),5 or it may incite restrictive practices – the kind of ‘club-
biness’ that, once preeminent, favours known authors in a closed circle of mutual citation.
Using the lens of club economics does not immediately solve the financial problems of 
scholarly publishing, but it allows us to see these problems in a new way. In particular, we 
argue that it provides a better way than current market models of understanding how com-
plex contributions are generating collective goods. While the analysis of complex situations 
requires more work and more detailed modelling, we can already see that it offers a different 
diagnosis of the problems and will therefore point the way to new solutions.
Understanding change
Applying the model is one thing, showing that it is useful, ideally predictive, is quite another. 
A way to test this is to consider changes to our hypothetical journal from its native state as 
painted above. An obvious change, and one that more closely models reality for small society 
journals, is the expansion of authorship. What happens when authors who are not society 
members seek to join the club by publishing in the journal? We expect entrepreneurialism at 
the margins, so that changes in who is excluded are likely to be framed as experiments. We 
also expect differential tolls owing to non-anonymous congestion. Authors who bring pres-
tige, or unique content that adds to the prestige of the journal, or attract new membership, 
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are therefore likely to be sought out, with formal membership requirements and payments 
being waived (by, say, the award of an honorary fellowship or allowing a celebrity author to 
retain copyright over material). The calculus for the author will depend on the externalities 
the club provides (prestige, a particular readership, and so on).
Emerging technologies and knowledge clubs
The implications of seeing scholarly journals as club goods, as opposed to public or private 
goods, is that we can begin to formulate clear models, and – with emerging technologies – 
to enact them. The club aspects of scholarly journals involve delivering prestige factors for 
those within the community of peer producers, as well as the practical distribution mech-
anisms required to ensure that mutual attention within the knowledge club is secured. In 
the digital environment, academic journals have retained their club-like qualities through 
blind peer review (even more through open review), and via editorial boards that are care-
fully constructed to ‘send the right signals’ in order to build prestige and quality assurance. 
However, in the case of commercial scholarly journals, those who do the work to generate 
these externalities for the group are outsourcing production to commercial companies, as 
well as the infrastructures that measure and reveal citations and impact factors.
Emerging technologies hold promise in that they may enable new forms of automated 
coordination that overcome the need to outsource publication, distribution and search, 
thereby returning these functions to the knowledge club itself. Understanding journals 
as club goods is useful here because it allows us to interrogate which parts of the current 
system we might wish to protect or enhance, and which are superfluous or detrimental to 
knowledge productivity.
Blockchain technology has been described as a giant distributed ledger (Swan, 2015) 
used for asset registry, inventory and exchange, originally built for bitcoin but increasingly 
applied to other systems, including legal contracts and identity verification. The importance 
of blockchain technology is that it can achieve trust (a major club benefit) in a trustless 
(open network) internet through encryption and automation. According to Buterin (2015), 
blockchain is not about enforcing one set of rules, but ‘creating the freedom to create a new 
mechanism with a new ruleset extremely quickly and pushing it out’. Blockchain technology 
can thereby provide a technical layer upon which decentralised governance systems can run. 
In the case of scholarly publishing, blockchain could be used to resolve current weaknesses 
in the system, including securing peer review and generating trusted and open citation 
metrics. For instance, blockchain technology can transform such attributes as citations into 
token-like objects, resulting in trustworthy open metrics as opposed to proprietary database 
systems. A token-like system could also shift what is currently volunteer-based labour into 
an incentive-compatible system that rewards referees and editors, not just authors. For 
instance, refereeing journal articles might result in micropayments (either monetary or 
reputation-based) that accrue to those who perform such tasks, providing transparency 
of labour on the production side and encouraging those within the club to perform tasks 
that, under current conditions, they are increasingly reluctant to perform (to such an extent 
that Big 5 publishers now routinely offer incentives to referees, such as discounted prices 
on their products). Platforms such as Steem, experimental at the time of writing, work on 
similar systems.6
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Such technologies could also be used to authenticate academic works that have been 
through the process of peer review and editorial acceptance. If a scholarly work has been 
assigned the value of ‘accepted’ on the blockchain, then the need for physical or digital 
journal artefacts diminishes. It is foreseeable that authors could distribute a work through 
whatever means they feel is appropriate (for instance, a university repository) and be assured 
that it possesses identifiers that prove the knowledge club (journal) has accepted the work. 
These same identifiers could be used for searching, effectively bundling knowledge club 
outputs from across a distributed system such that the knowledge club’s ends (to form 
knowledge-making communities) are reprioritised over its means (journals as consumer 
products). The journal itself may not be necessary, reducing or eliminating production 
costs altogether. This would mirror the current experience of many student readers who 
have no interest in the journal but scour individual papers for suitable quotations. For 
scholars, however, this may present a more serious challenge, further individualising and 
commodifying the production of knowledge (individual authors and papers, detached from 
clubs and groups), and fragmenting or decomposing the culture of scholarship. Finding the 
best model of distributed governance for journals is therefore an important task. Different 
rewards for different kinds of contributions is one possibility; rewarding collaboration, 
interdisciplinary research, the re-testing of results, and other forms of club consolidation 
are just some possibilities. A question for further research and a problem for cultural sci-
ence, then, is how to preserve the club (the ‘end’) while reducing the cost of the good (the 
‘means’). Or should publishers transform their own business model to provide a service for 
knowledge clubs, supporting the formation of new clubs rather than relying on individual 
competitiveness among authors?
Conclusion: knowledge clubs evolve
Scholarly publishing works best as a club good. This matters to economics because the 
standard diagnosis is that publishing is a private good with public good aspects, and is thus 
analysed through the lens of information economics and market failure. The consequence 
is a misdiagnosis: the crisis in scholarly publishing may not, in fact, be an industrial trans-
formation with complex consequences. If it is instead a process of club evolution, then 
scholars themselves will need to develop new and better governance models to maintain the 
productive power of knowledge-making communities, rather than the prestige of restrictive 
titles (e.g. Frey, 2003; Gans, 2017).
Knowledge clubs are communities with governance structures that evolve through dif-
ferential variation and selection (largely through entry by new scholars, and exit as scholars 
leave) in the context of the institutional structure of clubs (through which scholars interact, 
in part through the mechanism of publishing). The arguments of Karl Popper (1963) and 
Thomas Kuhn (1970) on the nature and structure of scientific revolutions reinforce this club-
like aspect of the dynamics of science, as does the history of important discipline-forming 
groups, including Austrian economics (Dekker, 2016) and empirical science itself (Shirky, 
2010). Modelling scholarly publishing as a club good starts by focusing on the way in which 
scholarly output is produced and consumed. Producers of knowledge seek to interact with 
other producers whose ideas they will consume as a fuzzy set of that same knowledge. The 
gain from such club formation is the ability to confer externalities on each other in the form 
of readership, critique and understanding, and is set against the congestion costs imposed, 
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along with the negative aspects of ‘clubbiness’ that may set in once exclusivity (status) is 
tradable in a social network market. The crowding costs are access to those same journal 
slots, which increases the larger the club. The general equilibrium logic is that there will be 
an optimal number of scholarly clubs (journals) and an optimal allocation of scholars over 
clubs. There will be a finite number of clubs, and each club will contain a finite number of 
scholars, and each scholar may be a member of several or many clubs. Club theory is the 
natural language of the economic analysis of scholarly publishing.
However, knowledge is expansive and dynamic and not a zero sum game. As the cultural 
science approach demonstrates, knowledge is cultural as well as economic and co-evolves 
with communication technologies. Thus, ‘general equilibrium’ and ‘finite number’ are con-
textual terms in a larger frame of reference applying only to incumbent players (already 
certified scholars). But communications technologies, such as the internet – the very tech-
nologies that have undermined existing business models – are also generating new kinds 
of knowledge club beyond the purview and scope of scholarly communication as presently 
constituted. There remains an external creative destructive competitive pressure on schol-
arly institutions overall, be they epistemological (disciplines), spatial (universities), local 
(specialist knowledge clubs) or institutional (such publishers as university presses). An 
implication is that scholars themselves need to attend to the dynamics of club formation, 
which may already be much more advanced in informal DIY, start-up and entrepreneurial 
environments than in the papyrocentric universe of peer review journals. Creative destruc-
tion is at hand. Publishers should be concerned, but those who should worry most are those 
who produce and consume knowledge without really understanding the value of knowledge 
clubs and commons. If a journal is a club, we should be creating new types of journals that 
nurture the dynamic formation of new knowledge clubs.
Notes
1.  This is closely related to the concept of a community of practice (Amin and Roberts, 2008).
2.  We mean this in the sense both of open innovation economics (models of open knowledge 
production) (von Hippel, 2005; Chesbrough, 2003), and also of team production (Alchian 
and Demsetz, 1972). An ‘open team’ is a concept that is separately defined in microeconomics, 
but not in its conjunction (cf. an innovation commons).
3.  Scholarly publishing has the same logic as a research department in the sense of organising 
itself into problem-domain themes – a point that has been made by Kling et al. (2002) in 
reference to the efficacy of the underlying guild model of scientific production and publishing.
4.  For example, invited articles with the implication of lower refereeing hurdles, or free 
submission to journals normally requiring article processing charges.
5.  For Cinema Journal see http://www.cmstudies.org/?page=cinema_journal; and for the Journal 
of Finance see http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1540-6261/homepage/
Society.html, where ‘Membership in the Association is ... available only through written 
application’.
6.  https://steem.io/.
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